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Abstract
In this paper, we present three distributed algorithms to solve a class of generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
seeking problems in strongly monotone games. The first one (SD-GENO) is based on synchronous updates of the
agents, while the second and the third (AD-GEED and AD-GENO) represent asynchronous solutions that are robust
to communication delays. AD-GENO can be seen as a refinement of AD-GEED, since it only requires node auxiliary
variables, enhancing the scalability of the algorithm. Our main contribution is to prove converge to a variational GNE
of the game via an operator-theoretic approach. Finally, we apply the algorithms to network Cournot games and show
how different activation sequences and delays affect convergence. We also compare the proposed algorithms to the
only other in the literature (ADAGNES), and observe that AD-GENO outperforms the alternative.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and literature overview
In modern society, multi-agent network systems arise
in several areas, leading to increasing research activ-
ities. When self-interested agents interact between
each other, one of the best mathematical tools to
study the emerging collective behavior is noncooper-
ative game theory over networks. In fact, networked
games emerges in several application domains, such as
smart grids [1, 2], social networks [3] and distributed
robotics [4, 5]. In a game setup, the players (or agents)
aim at minimizing a local and private cost function
which represents their individual interest, and, at the
same time, satisfy local and global constraints, limiting
the possible decisions, or strategies. Usually, there is a
dependency of the cost and the constraints of a player
from the strategies of a subset of other players, gener-
ically called “neighbors”. Thus, each decision is influ-
enced by some local information, which is typically ex-
changed with the neighbors. One popular notion of so-
lution for these games is a collective equilibrium where
no player benefits from unilaterally changing its strat-
egy, see [6].
In [3, 7, 8], the authors focused on developing
synchronous and distributed equilibrium seeking algo-
rithms for noncooperative games, namely, the case in
which all the agents update their strategies at the same
time. Even though this assumption is quite common,
it can lead to sever limitations in the case of hetero-
geneous agents in the game. For example, imagine to
have two types of agents, divided in terms of good and
bad performances, in a synchronous update scheme; the
former must wait the latter before a new update can be
carried on. In fact, this would produce a bottleneck in
the overall performance. To overcome this problem, we
focus on developing asynchronous update rules. More-
over, it is known that asynchronicity can also speed up
the convergence, facilitate the insertion of new agents in
the network and even increase robustness w.r.t. commu-
nication faults, see [9] and references therein.
Among the very first works on asynchronous dis-
tributed optimization, the one of Bertsekas and Tsit-
siklis in [10] stands out. From there onward, sev-
eral authors elaborated on these ideas and produced
novel results for convex optimization [11, 12, 13, 14].
In [15], Yi and Pavel developed an asynchronous algo-
rithm to solve noncooperative generalized games sub-
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ject to equality constraints. This result was enabled by
the framework (ARock), recently introduced by Peng
et al. in [16], that provides a wide range of asyn-
chronous variations of the classical fixed point iterative
algorithms.
In this paper, we propose an asynchronous algorithm
robust to delayed information to solve noncooperative
games subject to affine coupling constraints. Further-
more, to achieve a fully decentralized update rule, we
rely only on node auxiliary variables, preserving the
scalability in the case of a large number of agents. This
result is a significant contribution, due to the technical
challenges in the asynchronous implementation of the
algorithm, addressed by carefully analyzing the influ-
ence of the delayed information on the dynamics of the
auxiliary variables. Finally, we compare the proposed
solution to the one in [15], for the case of a Cournot
game, showing that our algorithm achieves faster con-
vergence. A preliminary and partial version of these re-
sults were presented in [17].
1.2. Organization of the paper
In Section 3, we formalize the problem setup and
define the concept of variational GNE. In Section 4,
we derive the iterative algorithm for GNE seeking for
the synchronous case, i.e., SD-GENO. Its asynchronous
counterpart (AD-GEED), that adopt edge auxiliary vari-
ables, is then presented in Section 5. The main result of
the paper is presented in Section 6, where we introduce
AD-GENO. Section 7 is dedicated to the simulation re-
sults and to the comparison between the different algo-
rithms performance. Section 8 ends the paper present-
ing the conclusions and the outlooks of this work.
2. Notation
2.1. Basic notation
The set of real, positive, and non-negative numbers
are denoted by R, R>0, R≥0, respectively; R B R∪{∞}.
The set of natural numbers is N. For a square matrix
A ∈ Rn×n, its transpose is A>, [A]i is the i-th row of
the matrix and [A]i j represents the element in i-th row
and j-th column. A  0 (A  0) stands for a pos-
itive definite (semidefinite) matrix, instead > (≥) de-
scribes element wise inequality. A ⊗ B is the Kro-
necker product of the matrices A and B. The iden-
tity matrix is denoted by In ∈ Rn×n. 0 (resp. 1) is
the vector/matrix with only 0 (resp. 1) elements. For
x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, the collective vector is denoted by x :=
col((xi)i∈(1,...,N)) B [x>1 , . . . , x
>
N]
>. diag((Ai)i∈(1,...,N))
describes a block-diagonal matrix with the matrices
A1, . . . , AN on the main diagonal. The null space of a
matrix A is denoted as ker(A). The Cartesian product of
the sets Ωi, i = 1, . . . ,N is
∏N
i=1 Ωi.
2.2. Operator-theoretic notation
The identity operator is denoted by Id(·). The set val-
ued mapping NC : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the normal cone to
the set C ⊆ Rn, that is NC(x) = {u ∈ Rn | sup〈C − x, u〉 ≤
0} if x ∈ C and ∅ otherwise. The graph of a set val-
ued mapping A : X ⇒ Y is gra(A) := {(x, u) ∈
X × Y | u ∈ A(x)}. For a function φ : Rn → R,
define dom(φ) := {x ∈ Rn|φ(x) < +∞} and its sub-
differential set-valued mapping, ∂φ : dom(φ) ⇒ Rn,
∂φ(x) := {u ∈ Rn| 〈y− x|u〉+φ(x) ≤ φ(y) , ∀y ∈ dom(φ)}.
The projection operator over a closed set S ⊆ Rn is
projS (x) : Rn → S and it is defined as projS (x) :=
argminy∈S ‖y − x‖2. A set valued mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn
is `-Lipschitz continuous with ` > 0, if ‖u−v‖ ≤ `‖x−y‖
for all (x, u) , (y, v) ∈ gra(F ); F is (strictly) monotone
if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F ) 〈u − v, x − y〉 ≥ (>)0
holds true, and maximally monotone if it does not exist
a monotone operator with a graph that strictly contains
gra(F ). Moreover, it is α-strongly monotone if for all
(x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F ) it holds 〈x − y, u − v〉 ≥ α‖x − y‖2.
The operator F is η-averaged (η-AVG) with η ∈ (0, 1) if
‖F (x)−F (y)‖2 ≤ ‖x−y‖2− 1−η
η
‖(Id−F )(x)−(Id−F )(y)‖2
for all x, y ∈ Rn; F is β-cocoercive if βF is 12 -averaged,
i.e. firmly nonexpansive (FNE). The resolvent of an op-
eratorA : Rn ⇒ Rn is JA := (Id +A)−1.
3. Problem Formulation
3.1. Mathematical formulation
We consider a noncooperative game Γ between N
agents (or players) subject to affine coupling constraints.
We define the game as the triplet Γ B (X, { fi}i∈{1...N},G),
where its elements are respectively: the collective fea-
sible decision set, the players’ local cost functions and
the graph describing the communication network. In the
following subsections, each one of them is introduced.
3.1.1. Feasible strategy set
Every agent i ∈ N := {1, . . . ,N} has a local decision
variable (or strategy) xi belonging to its private deci-
sion set Ωi ⊂ Rni , namely the set of all those strate-
gies that satisfy the local constraints of player i. The
collective vector of all the strategies, or strategy profile
of the game, is denoted as x B col(x1, . . . , xN) ∈ Rn,
where n B
∑
i∈N ni. Then, all the decision variables of
all the players other than i are represented via the com-
pact notation x−i B col(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN). We
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assume that the agents are subject to m affine coupling
constraints described by the affine function x 7→ Ax+ b,
where A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm. Thus, the collective feasi-
ble decision set can be written as
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b} , (1)
where Ω =
∏
i∈N Ωi ⊂ Rn, is the Cartesian product of
the local constraints sets Ωi’s. Accordingly, the set of
all the feasible strategies of each agent i ∈ N reads as
Xi(x−i) :=
{
y ∈ Ωi | Aiy − bi ≤ ∑ j∈N\{i} (b j − A jx j)} ,
where A = [A1, . . . , AN], Ai ∈ Rm×ni and ∑Nj=1 b j =
b. The choice of affine coupling constraints is widely
spread in the literature of noncooperative games, see
e.g., [7, 18, 19]. Moreover, in [3, Remark 3], it is high-
lighted that separable and convex coupling constraints
can always be rewritten in an affine form. Finally, we
introduce some standard assumptions [7, 19] on the sets
just introduced.
Standing Assumption 1 (Convex constraint sets). For
each player i ∈ N , the set Ωi is convex, nonempty and
compact. The feasible local set Xi(x−i) satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification. 
3.1.2. Cost functions
Each player i ∈ N has a local cost function
fi(xi, x−i) : Ωi × Ω−i → R, where Ω−i B ∏ j∈N\{i}Ω j.
The coupling between the players appears not only in
the constraints but also in the cost function, due to the
dependency on both xi and x−i. Next, we assume some
properties for these functions that are extensively used
in the literature [6, 7].
Standing Assumption 2 (Convex and differentiable
cost functions). For all i ∈ N , the cost function fi is
continuous, continuously differentiable and convex in its
first argument. 
3.1.3. Communication network
The communication between agents is described by
an undirected and connected graph G = (N ,E) where
E ⊆ N × N is the set of edges. Given two agents
i, j ∈ N , the couple (i, j) belongs to E, if agent i shares
information with agent j and vice versa. Then we say
that j is a neighbour of i, i.e., j ∈ Ni where Ni is the
neighbourhood of i. The number of edges in the graph
is denoted by E B |E|. To define the incidence ma-
trix V ∈ RE×N associated to G, let us label the edges
as el, for l ∈ {1, . . . , E}. We define the entry [V]li B 1
(resp. −1) if el = (i, ·) (resp. el = (·, i)) and 0 oth-
erwise. The decision of which of the two agents com-
posing an edge is the sink and which the source is ar-
bitrary. By construction, V1N = 0N . Then, we define
Eouti (resp. Eini ) as the set of all the indexes l of the
edges el that start from (resp. end in) node i, and hence
Ei = Eouti ∪ Eini . The node Laplacian L ∈ RN×N of
an undirected graph is a symmetric matrix defined by
L B V>V , [20, Lem. 8.3.2]. Another important prop-
erty of L, used in the remainder, is L1N = 0N .
3.2. Generalized Nash Equilibrium
In summary, the considered generalized game is de-
scribed by the following set of inter-dependent opti-
mization problems:
∀i ∈ N :
argminy∈Rni fi(y, x−i)s.t. y ∈ Xi(x−i) . (2)
The most popular equilibrium concept considered for
noncooperative games with coupling constraints is the
generalized Nash equilibrium, thus the configuration in
which all the relations in (2) simultaneously hold.
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium). A collec-
tive strategy x∗ ∈ X is a generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) if, for each player i, it holds
fi(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ inf
{
fi(y, x∗−i) | y ∈ Xi(x∗−i)
}
. 
In this work, we focus on a subset of GNE, the
so called variational GNE (v-GNE), that has attained
growing interest in the recent years– see [6, 8, 21]. The
name of these equilibria derives from the fact that they
can be formulated as the solutions to a variational in-
equality (VI). An important property of these equilibria
is that each agent faces the same penalty to fulfill the
coupling constraints, which is particularly useful to rep-
resent a “fair” competition between agents [6]. Varia-
tional GNE can be seen as a particular case of the con-
cept of normalized equilibrium points, firstly introduced
by Rosen in [22] and further studied in [19, 23].
To properly characterize this set, we define the
pseudo-gradient mapping (or game mapping) of (2), as
F(x) = col
(
(∇xi fi(xi, x−i))i∈N
)
. (3)
The pseudo-gradient gathers in a collective vector form
the gradients of the cost functions each w.r.t. the local
decision variable. Next, we introduce some standard
technical assumptions, e.g., [24, 25].
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Standing Assumption 3. The mapping F in (3) is α-
strongly monotone and `-Lipschitz continuous, for some
α, ` > 0. 
When Standing assumption 3 holds true, the mapping
F is single valued and the set of v-GNE of the game in
(2) corresponds to the solution to VI(F,X), namely the
problem of finding a vector x∗ ∈ X such that
〈F(x∗), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (4)
The continuity of F (Assumption 2) and compactness of
X (Assumption 1) imply the existence of a solution to
VI(F,X), while the strong monotonicity (Assumption 3)
entails uniqueness, see [26, Th. 2.3.3].
Next, let us define the KKT conditions associated to
the game in (2). The strong duality of the problem (As-
sumptions 1, 2) implies that, if x∗ is a GNE of (2), then
there exist N dual variables λ∗i ∈ Rm≥0, for all i ∈ N , such
that the following inclusions are satisfied:
∀i ∈ N :
0 ∈ ∇xi fi(x∗i ) + A>i λ∗i + NΩi (x∗i ) ,0 ∈ b − Ax∗ + NRm≥0 (λ∗i ) . (5)
Instead of looking for the solution of the general case
where λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
N may be different, we examine the spe-
cial case when λ∗ B λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗N , namely
∀i ∈ N :
0 ∈ ∇xi fi(x∗i ) + A>i λ∗ + NΩi (x∗i ) ,0 ∈ b − Ax∗ + NRm≥0 (λ∗) . (6)
It follows from [27, Th. 3.1(ii)], that the KKT inclusions
in (6) correspond to the solution set to VI(F,X). Thus,
every solution x∗ to VI(F,X) is also a GNE of the game
in (2), [27, Th. 3.1(i)]. Since the solution set to VI(F,X)
is a singleton, we conclude that there exists a unique v-
GNE of the game (2).
4. Synchronous Distributed GNE Seeking Algo-
rithm
We first introduce the synchronous counterpart
of AD-GENO. The derivation of the Synchronous
Distributed GNE Seeking Algorithm with Node vari-
ables (SD-GENO) has as cornerstone an operator split-
ting approach to solve the KKT system in (6). Origi-
nally proposed in [7, 8] in the contest of GNE finding
problems.
4.1. Algorithm design
The KKT conditions of each agent i in (5) are sat-
isfied by a couple (xi, λi), where the dual variables
λi may be different among the players. If we en-
force the consensus among the dual variables, then the
unique solution of the inclusions is the v-GNE of the
game. This is achieved by exploiting the fact that
ker(V) = span(1) and introducing the auxiliary vari-
ables σl, l ∈ {1, . . . , E}, one for every edge in the
graph. Using the notations λ B col((λi)i∈N ) ∈ RmN ,
Λ B diag((Ai)i∈N ) ∈ RmN×n, b¯ B col((bi)i∈N ) ∈ RmN ,
σ B col((σl)l∈{1...E}) ∈ RmE , V B V ⊗ Im ∈ RmE×mN and
L B L ⊗ Im ∈ RmE×mN , we cast the augmented version
of the inclusions in (5) by
0 ∈ F(x) + Λ>λ + NΩ(x)
0 ∈ b¯ − Λx + NRmN≥0 (λ) + Lλ + ρV>σ
0 = −ρVλ ,
(7)
where ρ ∈ R>0.
A solution $ = col(x∗,σ∗, λ∗) of the above inclu-
sions can be equivalently recast as a zero of the sum of
two mappingsA and B defined as
A : $ 7→
 0 0 Λ
>
0 0 −ρV
−Λ ρV> 0
$ +

NΩ(x)
0
NRmN≥0 (λ)

B : $ 7→
 F(x)0b¯ + Lλ
 .
(8)
In fact, $∗ ∈ zer(A + B) if and only if $∗ satisfies (7).
Next, we show that the zeros of A + B characterize
the v-GNE of the original game.
Proposition 1. Let A and B be as in (8). Then the
following hold:
(i) zer(A + B) , ∅ ,
(ii) if col(x∗,σ∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+B) then (x∗, λ∗) satisfies
the KKT conditions in (5), with λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗N ,
hence x∗ is the unique v-GNE of the game in (2).

The proof is attained by exploiting the property that
ker(V) = ker(L), for the graph described in Sec-
tion 3.1.3. The steps are similar to those in [7, Th. 2].
We omit them here for brevity reasons.
Several researchers have analyzed the problem of
finding a zero of the sum of two monotone operators.
The so called splitting methods represent one of the
most popular approach developed to attain an iterative
algorithm to solve this class of problem - see [28], [29,
Ch. 26].
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Lemma 1. The mappingsA andB in (8) are maximally
monotone. Moreover, B is χ-cocoercive, where χ B
min
{
α
`2
, λmax(L)−1
}
. 
Proof. See Appendix A
The properties of the operators proved above drive
us to select the preconditioned forward-backward split-
ting (PFB) to derive a distributed and iterative algo-
rithm seeking zer(A+B). This approach was previously
adopted by other researchers, e.g., [7].
The PFB splitting operator reads as
T B JΦ−1A ◦ (Id − Φ−1B) . (9)
The so-called preconditioning matrix Φ is defined by
Φ :=
τ
−1 0 −Λ>
0 δ−1ImM ρV
−Λ ρV> ε−1
 (10)
where δ ∈ R>0, ε = diag((εi)i∈N ) ⊗ Im with εi > 0, for
all i ∈ N and τ is defined in a similar way.
The update rule of the algorithm is obtained by in-
cluding a relaxation step, i.e.,
$˜(k) = T$(k)
$(k + 1) = $(k) + η($˜(k) −$(k)) . (11)
It comes from (9) that fix(T ) = zer(A + B), in fact
$ ∈ fix(T ) ⇔ $ ∈ T$ ⇔ 0 ∈ Φ−1(A + B)$ ⇔ $ ∈
zer(A + B), see [29, Th. 26.14].
In the remainder of this section, we provide the
complete derivation of SD-GENO, obtained directly
from (11). In the following, we denote $ B $(k),
$+ B $(k + 1) and $˜ B $˜(k) to simplify the no-
tation. Consider $˜ = T$. From (9) it holds that
$˜ = JγΦ−1A ◦ (Id−γΦ−1B)$⇔ Φ($−$˜) ∈ A$˜+B$,
thus
0 ∈ A$˜ + B$ + Φ($˜ −$) . (12)
The update rule of each components of $ is attained
by analyzing the row blocks of (12). The first reads as
0 ∈ F(x) + NΩ(x˜) + τ−1(x˜ − x) + Λ>λ. By solving this
inclusion by x˜, we attain the update rule for the primal
variables:
x˜ = JNΩ ◦
(
x − τ(F(x) + Λ>λ)) . (13)
Similarly, from the second row block of (12), we attain
the update for σ˜, i.e.,
σ˜ = σ + δρVλ . (14)
Finally, the third row block of (12) is 0 ∈ b¯ + Lλ +
NRmN≥0 (λ˜) + Λ(2x˜ − x) + ρV>(2σ˜ −σ) + ε−1(λ˜ − λ), from
which we obtain
λ˜ = JNRmN≥0
◦ (λ + ε(Λ(2x˜ − x) − b¯ − ρV>(2σ˜ − σ) − Lλ))
(14)
= projRmN≥0
(
λ + ε(Λ(2x˜ − x) − b¯
− ρV>σ − (2δρ2 + 1)Lλ)) .
(15)
Note that, the update of λ˜ depends only on the aggre-
gate information V>σ. We can exploit this feature to
replace the edge auxiliary variables σl’s, with a single
variable for each agent i defined by zi B
(
[V>]i⊗Im)σ ∈
RmN . Recalling that V>V = L ⊗ Im C L, we compute
the update rule of these new variables and replace (14)
by
z˜ = V>σ + δρV>Vλ = z + δρLλ . (16)
Consequently, (15) is modified accordingly as
λ˜ = projRmN≥0
(
λ + ε(Λ(2x˜ − x) − b¯
− ρz − (2δρ2 + 1)Lλ)) . (17)
To ensure that this change of variables does not affect
the equilibrium of the game, we introduce the following
result proving that an equilibrium point of the new set
of equations is indeed a v-GNE of (2).
Theorem 1. If col(x∗, z∗, λ∗) is a solution to the equa-
tions (13), (16), (17), with 1> z∗ = 0, then x∗ is a v-GNE
of the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. In [15], the algorithm SYDNEY achieves
convergence to the v-GNE of the game (2), when this is
subject to equality coupling constraints only. This so-
lution relies on edge auxiliary variables to enforce the
consensus of the λi’s. Therefore, the number of vari-
ables that each agent has to store is O(N).
The change of “variables”, from σ to z, is partic-
ularly useful in large not-so-sparse networks and it is
in general convenient when the edges outnumber the
nodes. In fact, it implies that the number of variables
grows linearly with the number of nodes, and thus the
memory requirement for each player is O(1). This fact
and the possibility to handle affine coupling constraints
represent the main advantages of adopting SD-GENO
over SYDNEY. 
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Algorithm 1: SD-GENO
Input: k = 0, for all i ∈ N , xi(0) ∈ Rni , λi(0) ∈ Rm,
zi(0) = 0m.
Choose δ, εi, τi satisfying (19), while η ∈ (0, 1)
and ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Iteration k:
Communication: each i ∈ N gathers λ j(k) from
the neighbors and updates the disagreement vector
di(k) B
∑
j∈Ni (λi − λ j)
Local update, for i ∈ N do
x˜i = projΩi
(
xi − τi(∇i fi(xi, x−i) + A>i λi)
)
z˜i = zi + ρ δ di(k)
λ˜i = projRm≥0
(
λi + εi (Ai(2x˜i − xi) − bi
−ρzi − (2δρ2 + 1)di(k)))
x+i = xi + η(x˜i − xi)
z+i = zi + η(z˜i − zi)
λ+i = λi + η(λ˜i − λi)
k ← k + 1
4.2. Synchronous, distributed algorithm with node vari-
ables (SD-GENO)
The complete formulation of the algorithm is ob-
tained by gathering together all the update rules intro-
duced in the previous section, i.e., (13), (16), (17) and
adding a relaxation step. The algorithm in compact
form is expressed as
x˜ = projΩ
(
x − τ(F(x) + Λ>λ))
z˜ = z + ρδLλ
λ˜ = projRmN≥0
(
λ + ε(Λ(2x˜ − x) − b¯
−ρz − (2δρ2 + 1)Lλ))
x+ = x + η(x˜ − x)
z+ = z + η( z˜ − z)
λ+ = λ + η(λ˜ − λ) ,
(18)
while the local updates and the initial condition of SD-
GENO are provided in Algorithm 1. It is composed of
two main phases: the communication with the neigh-
bors and the local update. First, each agent gathers the
information about the strategies and the dual variables
of the neighbors. Next, the local update is performed,
based on a gradient descend and dual ascend structure.
It is worth noticing that only one round of communica-
tion is required at each iteration of SD-GENO.
The convergence of SD-GENO to the v-GNE of the
game in (2) is proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Set the step sizes εi, δ, τi, for all i ∈ N ,
such that
τi ≤ (‖Ai‖ + ϑ)−1 (19a)
δ ≤ (2ρ + ϑ)−1 (19b)
εi ≤ (ρ|Ni| + ‖Ai‖ + ϑ)−1 , (19c)
ϑ >
1
2χ
(19d)
with χ as in Lemma 1 and η ∈ (0, 4χϑ−12χϑ ). Then, the se-
quence (x(k))k∈N generated by SD-GENO (Algorithm 1)
converges to the v-GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix A.
5. Asynchronous Distributed Algorithm with Edge
Variables (AD-GEED)
In the case of heterogeneous agents with very differ-
ent update rates, SD-GENO can converge slowly, due to
its synchronous structure. To overcome this limitation,
we introduce here the Asynchronous Distributed GNE
Seeking Algorithm with Edge variables (AD-GEED). It
uses edge auxiliary variables {σl}l∈{1...E} and an asyn-
chronous update to compute the v-GNE of the game
in (2). As discussed in the previous section, this is
not an ideal solution due to the poor scalability in the
case of dense networks. A refinement of this algorithm,
which relies on node variables only, is provided in Sec-
tion 6. From a technical point of view, the asynchronic-
ity is achieved by exploiting an asynchronous frame-
work for fixed-point iterations, the so called “ARock”
framework, developed in [16].
5.1. Algorithm design
The update rule in the asynchronous case, is similar to
that in (11), with the main difference that, at each time
instant, only one agent i ∈ N updates its strategy xi,
dual variable λi and local auxiliary variables {σl}l∈Eouti .
To mathematically formulate this concept we introduce
N diagonal matrices Hi, where [Hi] j j is 1 if the j-th ele-
ment of col(x, σ, λ) is an element of col(xi, {σl}l∈Eouti , λi)
and 0 otherwise. The matrix Hi triggers the update of
those elements in $ that are associated to agent i. We
assume that the choice of the agent performing the up-
date at time instant k is ruled by an i.i.d. random vari-
able ζ(k), taking values in H := {Hi}i∈N . Given a dis-
crete probability distribution (p1, . . . , pN), let P[ζ(k) =
Hi] = pi, for all i ∈ N . Therefore, the update rule in the
asynchronous case is cast as
$(k + 1) = $(k) + ηζ(k)(T$(k) −$(k)) . (20)
An illustrative example is now provided to clarify
how to construct H.
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Example 1. Consider a game with N = 3, E = 2,
m = 1, ni = 1, i = 1, 2, 3 and $ is the collective vec-
tor of all the strategies and auxiliary variables in the
game. The communication network is described by the
undirected graph G, where the arrows describe the con-
vention adopted for the edges.
In this case, H is a set of three 8×8 matrices, namely
H1 B diag((1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0))
H2 B diag((0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0))
H3 B diag((0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)) .
If at time k agent 2 is updating, (20) turns into
$(k + 1) = $(k) + ηH2(T$(k) −$(k)) . (21)
So, the only elements of $ that change are (x2, σ2, λ2),
precisely the variables associated to agent 2. 
In addition to asynchronicity, we generalize (20) by
considering possible delays in the information used by
each agent in the local update, i.e., the information gath-
ered from the neighbors may be outdated, denoted as $ˆ.
These delays are due to a non-neglectable computation
time for the update of the agents, refer to [16, Sec. 1]
for a more complete overview on the topic. All the vari-
ables updated by the same agent share the same delay,
e.g., xi, λi and {σl}l∈Eouti has a delay ϕi(k) ≥ 0 at time
instant k.
According to this, the final formulation of the update
rule (20) becomes
$(k + 1) = $(k) + ηζ(k)(T − Id)$ˆ(k) . (22)
The only assumption that we impose over the delay,
is boundedness, as formalized next.
Assumption 4 (Bounded maximum delay). The delays
are uniformly upper bounded, i.e. there exists ϕ¯ > 0
such that supk∈N≥0 maxi∈N {ϕi(k)} ≤ ϕ¯ < +∞. 
We assume that each agent i is equipped with a public
and private memory, the first one is used by the neigh-
bors to write their strategy (and dual/auxiliary variables)
Algorithm 2: AD-GEED
Input: k = 0, x0 ∈ Rn, λ0 ∈ RmN , σ0 = 0mM , chose
δ, εi, τi satisfying (19) and η ∈ (0, 1).
Iteration k: Select the agent ik with probability
P[ζ(k) = Hik ] = pik
Reading: Agent ik copies in its private memory the
current values of the public memory, i.e. xˆ j, λˆ j,
∀ j ∈ Nik and σˆl, ∀l ∈ Einik and l ∈ Eoutj .
Update:
x˜ik = projΩik
(
xik − τik (∇ik fik (xik , xˆ−ik ) + A>ikλik
)
σ˜l = σl + δρ([V]l ⊗ Im)λˆ , ∀l ∈ Eoutik
λ˜ik = projRm≥0
(
λik + εik
(
Aik (2x˜ik − xik ) − bik −
ρ([V>]ik ⊗ Im)σˆ − (2δρ2 + 1)
∑
j∈Nik (λi − λˆ j)
))
x+ik = xik + η(x˜ik − xik )
σ+l = σl + η(σ˜l − σl) , ∀l ∈ Eoutik
λ+i = λik + η(λ˜ik − λik )
Writing: in the public memories of each j ∈ Nik
(xik , λik )← (x+ik , λ+ik )
{σl}l∈Eoutik ← {σ
+
l }l∈Eoutik
k ← k + 1
at the end of each update. At the beginning of an up-
date, agent i copies the values from the public to the
private memory, and uses them to complete the update.
Notice that, during the update time of i, the neighbors
can still write in the public memory of i without affect-
ing the values stored in the private one. The local up-
date rules of AD-GEED are presented in Algorithm 2
and they are obtained with steps similar to those intro-
duced in Sec. 4.1 for SD-GENO. To ease the notation,
for each agent j ∈ N , we define xˆ j B x j(k + ϕ j(k)),
λˆ j B λ j(k−ϕ j(k)) and σˆl B σl(k−ϕ j(k)), for all l ∈ Eoutj ,
and furthermore xˆ B col((xˆ j) j∈N ), λˆ B col((λˆ j) j∈N ),
σˆ B col((σˆ j) j∈N ). Notice that each agent has always
access to the most recent value of its variables, i.e., for
agent i the delay ϕi(k) = 0 for every k.
The following convergence theorem is achived by ex-
ploiting the results in [16] for a Krasnosel’skii˘ asyn-
chronous iteration.
Theorem 3. For every i ∈ N , choose εi, δ, τi as in (19),
and let η ∈
(
0, cN pmin2ϕ¯√pmin+1
(
2 − 12χϑ
)]
and c ∈ (0, 1). Then,
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the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated by AD-GEED (Algo-
rithm 2) converges to the v-GNE of the game in (2) al-
most surely. 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 2. If the probability distribution is uniform,
i.e., pmin = 1N , and we choose ϑ =
1
χ
, then the bounds on
the relaxation step simplify as η ∈
(
0, 32
c
√
N
2ϕ¯+
√
N
]
. More-
over, if there is no delay, so ϕ¯ = 0, or the number of
agents is very high, the bounds may be chosen indepen-
dently from the number of players, e.g., as η ∈ (0, 1].

The structure of AD-GEED is similar to that of
ADAGNES in [15, Alg. 1], where edge auxiliary vari-
ables are used to achieve consensus over the dual vari-
ables. However, unlike ADAGNES, our algorithm can
handle inequality coupling constraints.
6. Asynchronous, distributed algorithm with node
variables (AD-GENO)
This section presents the main result of the paper,
namely, we refine AD-GEED to obtain an algorithm
with the same performance, in terms of convergence
speed, but relying on node auxiliary variables only, i.e.,
the Asynchronous Distributed GNE Seeking Algorithm
with Node variables (AD-GENO). Using Algorithm 2
as the starting point, we notice that the local update of
λi requires only the aggregate quantity ([V>]i ⊗ Im)σ.
Our key idea is to introduce a variable zi to capture the
variation of this aggregate quantity and show that it does
not affect the dynamics of the pair (xi, λi), thus preserv-
ing the convergence. Unlike the synchronous case, we
cannot directly define z = V>σ, due to the different up-
date frequency between {σl}l∈Ei and zi that would affect
the dynamics of λ. This mismatch is clarified via the
following example.
Example 2. Consider the communication network in
Example 1 and assume that in the first three time in-
stances, agent 2 updates twice and then 3 updates once,
i.e., i0 = i1 = 2 and i2 = 3. For k = 1, according to
Algorithm 2 it holds
σ2(2) = σ2(1) + ηρδ(λ2(1) − λ3(0))
λ2(2) ∝ ρ(σ2(1) − σ1(0)) , (23)
where ∝ is used to describe dependency. Next, for k = 2
only λ3 is updated, then
λ3(3) ∝ −ρσ2(2) . (24)
Algorithm 3: AD-GENO
Input: k = 0, x(0) ∈ Rn, λ(0) ∈ RmN , z(0) = 0mN .
For every i ∈ N , choose δ, εi, τi satisfying (19),
η ∈ (0, 1) and set µi = 0m.
Iteration k: Select the agent ik with probability
P[ζ(k) = Hik ] = pik
Reading: Agent ik copies its public memory in the
private one, i.e., the values xˆ j, λˆ j, ∀ j ∈ Nik , and µi.
Reset the public values of µi to 0m.
Update:
x˜ik = projΩik
(
xik − τik (∇ik fik (xik , xˆ−ik ) + A>ikλik )
)
z˜ik = zik + δηµik
λ˜ik = projRm≥0
(
λik + εik (Aik (2x˜ik − xik ) − bik −
ρz˜ik +(2δρ
2 − 1) ∑ j∈Nik \{ik}(λik − λˆ j))
x+ik = xik + η(x˜ik − xik )
z+ik = z˜ik + ηδρ
∑
l∈Eoutik ([V]l ⊗ Im)λˆ
λ+ik = λik + η(λ˜ik − λik )
Writing: in the public memory of each j ∈ Nik
(xik , λik )← (x+ik , λ+ik )
µ j ← µ j + λˆ j − λik
k ← k + 1
If we substitute the edge variables σ1, σ2 with zi =
[V>]iσ for i = 1, 2, 3, and apply the same activation
sequence, it leads to
z3(3) = z3(0) + ηρδ(λ3(0) − λ2(2))
λ3(3) ∝ ρz3(0) . (25)
From the comparison of (24) and (25), it is clear that
the value of λ3(3) would be different in the two cases.
This is explained by the fact that σ2 is updated twice,
while z3 only once. 
To bridge the gap between σ and z, we introduce an
extra variable µi ∈ Rm for each node i. The role of
µi is to store the changes of the neighbors dual vari-
able λ j during the time between the last update of i
and the next one. The scalability of the algorithm is
not affected by these additional variables, one for each
agent. Therefore, the benefit of adopting only node vari-
ables, highlighted in Remark 1, still hold also in this
asynchronous counterpart. Furthermore, also the num-
ber of required communications rounds between agents
does not increase, since the variable µi is updated by the
8
neighbors of agent i during their writing phase. Algo-
rithm 3 presents the local update rules of AD-GENO.
The convergence of AD-GENO is proven by the fol-
lowing theorem. Essentially, we show that introducing
z and µ does not affect the dynamics of (x, λ).
Theorem 4. For every i ∈ N choose εi, δ, τi as in (19).
Let η ∈
(
0, cN pmin2ϕ¯√pmin+1
(
2 − 12χϑ
)]
with pmin := min{pi}i∈N
and c ∈ (0, 1). Then, the sequence (x(k))k∈N generated
by AD-GENO (Algorithm 3) converges to the v-GNE of
the game in (2) almost surely. 
Proof. See Appendix C
7. Simulations
We conclude by proposing two sets of simulations to
validate the theoretical results in the previous sections
and to highlight the performances of the proposed algo-
rithm. First, we apply AD-GENO on a network Cournot
game and study how delays and different activation se-
quences affect the convergence. Then, we compare the
total computation time required by AD-GENO, AD-
GEED and ADAGNES (in [15, Alg. 1]), over different
communication graphs.
7.1. AD-GENO convergence
In a network Cournot game, N firms compete over
m markets and the coupling constraints arise from the
maximum markets capacities. We consider a smilar for-
mulation to that proposed in [30]. Here, we considered
N = 8 firms, with the possibility to act over m = 3
markets, i.e., xi ∈ R3, for all i ∈ N . The local pro-
duction is bounded in 0 ≤ xi ≤ xi, where each compo-
nent of xi ∈ R3 is randomly drawn from [10, 45]. In
Figure 1a, the interaction of each firm with the mar-
kets is shown, where an edge is drawn between a firm
and a market if the one of former’s strategies is applied
to the latter. Two firms are neighbors if they compete
over the same market, therefore the communication net-
work between the firms is the one in Figure 1b. The
coupling constraints are defined by Ax ≤ b, where
A B [A1, . . . , AN] ∈ R3×24 while b ∈ R3. The ele-
ment [Ai] jk is nonzero, if [xi]k > 0 and it is applied
to market j. Each nonzero element in A is randomly
chosen from [0.6, 1], this value can be seen as the ef-
ficiency of a strategy on a market. The components
of b ∈ R3 are the capacities of the markets, randomly
drawn from [20, 100]. The local cost function is de-
fined as fi(xi, x−i) B ci(x) − P(x)>Aixi; ci(x) and it de-
scribes the cost of opting for a certain strategy, while
CBA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(a)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(b)
Figure 1: (a) Action of players {1, . . . , 8} over the three markets A, B,
C, D, (b) Communication network arising from the competition over
the markets.
P(x) is the reward attained. The price is assumed lin-
ear P(x) = P¯ − DAx, where P¯ ∈ R3 and D ∈ R3×3 is
a diagonal matrix, their non zero components are ran-
domly chosen from [250, 500] and [1, 5] respectively.
The function ci(x) = x>i Qixi + q
>
i xi is quadratic, where
Qi ∈ R4×4 is diagonal and qi ∈ R4. Their values are
randomly chosen from [1, 8] and [1, 4], respectively.
In order to explore different setups we simulate three
different cases:
(A) The communication is delay free (ϕ¯ > 0) and
the activation sequence is alphabetic, and hence
P[ζ(k) = Hi] = 1N , for every i ∈ N .
(B) The activation sequence is still alphabetic, but the
communication may be delayed of 3 time instants
at most, i.e., ϕ¯ = 3.
(C) The communication has no delay, but the proba-
bility of update is different between agents, half of
them have pi = 16 , while the rest pi =
1
12 .
The outcome of these scenarios are presented in Fig-
ure 2. The main difference can be noticed in the case of
a non-uniform update probability; in fact we notice that
a skewer probability implies slower converge. From the
simulations performed, we have noticed that the pres-
ence of delay does not affect the convergence speed in a
drastic way, and, in some fortunate cases, can even lead
to a faster convergence. From simulations, we noticed
that the convergence of the dual variables is often the
bottleneck to high convergence performances. In all our
algorithms, we mitigated this effect by an appropriate
tuning of ρ. From (19), one can deduce that a smaller
value of ρ allows to choose a bigger εi, thus a bigger
step towards consensus.
7.2. Comparison between algorithms
Next, we compare the performance of AD-GENO
with respect to AD-GEED and ADAGNES, from a
computational time point of view. For the comparison
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2: (a) Normalized distance from the v-GNE, (b) Norm of the
disagreement between the dual variables, (c) Constraints violation.
with ADAGNES, we consider a modified version of the
Nash–Cournot game presented in Section 7.1 with the
coupling equality constraints Ax = b, namely, the over-
all production in each market must match the correspon-
dent capacity/demand. Here, we consider N = 40 firms,
each with at most ni = 2 products. To provide an ex-
tensive comparison, we considered many instances of
this game varying the communication between agents,
from a complete to a sparse graph. This is achieved
by increasing the number of markets. More precisely,
we considered the average degree of the nodes to create
graphs with a desired sparsity, e.g., if the node average
degree is 39 then the graph is complete. The other quan-
tities in the games are chosen as in the previous section.
We compared the algorithms over 160 different graphs.
The computational time required to obtain convergence
Figure 3: Comparison of the computation time of ADAGNES vs AD-
GENO (orange diamond) and AD-GEED vs AD-GENO (blue dots),
w.r.t. the variation of the communication network connectivity.
is compared in the three cases.1
The results of the simulations are presented in Fig-
ure 3. As expected AD-GENO always outperforms AD-
GEED, since it achieves the same dynamics of (x, λ)
with fewer auxiliary variables. As expected, the gap
between the two algorithms shrinks for a sparse graph
while it increases for a dense one, from ∼ 3% to ∼ 20%.
A similar behavior arises when AD-GENO is compared
to ADAGNES, due to the increment of auxiliary vari-
ables for highly connected graphs. In particular, the ad-
vantage in using AD-GENO starts from ∼ 20% when
the graph has an average degree of 3 and becomes
∼ 60% when the graph is complete.
8. Conclusion
Solving a GNE seeking problem in strongly mono-
tone games is possible via AD-GENO in an asyn-
chronous fashion, with node variables only, and by en-
suring resilience to delayed information. In our numer-
ical experience, AD-GENO outperforms the available
solutions in the literature, both in terms of computa-
tional time and number of variables required.
Unfortunately, the “ARock” framework does not en-
sure robustness to lossy communication. This is cur-
rently an open problem that is left to future research.
Another interesting topic is the generalization of the
algorithm to the case of time-varying communication
networks, as the independence from the edge variables
makes this approach more suitable to address this prob-
lem.
1The computation is performed on a single computer, thus the con-
sidered time is due to the local updates only and not the communica-
tions between the agents.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Section 4
Appendix A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
The operatorA is the sum of two operatorsA1 +A2,
the first is a real skew symmetric matrix, hence maxi-
mally monotone by [29, Ex. 20.35]. A2 is NΩ×0×NRmN≥0 ,
thus maximally monotone from [29, Ex. 20.26]. By [29,
Cor. 25.5(i)], we conclude that A is maximally mono-
tone, since dom(A1) = Rn+(E+N)m.
Notice that the cocoercity of an operator also im-
plies its maximally monotoniticy, see [29, Ex. 20.31].
Next, we prove the cocoercivity of B. For all $1, $2 ∈
dom(B) , it holds
〈B($1) − B($2)|x − y〉 =<
[ F(x1)−F(x2)
0
L(λ1−λ2)
]
|$1 −$2 >
=< F(x1) − F(x2)|x1 − x2 > +(λ1 − λ2)>L(λ1 − λ2)
≥ α
`2
‖F(x1) − F(x2)‖2 + λmax(L)−1‖L(λ1 − λ2)‖2
≥ min { α
`2
, λmax(L)−1
}‖B($1) − B($2)‖2
= χ ‖B($1) − B($2)‖2 ,
where the first inequality is attained by the α-strong
monotonicity and ` Lipschitzianity of F and by recall-
ing that for every symmetric real matrix M  0 it holds
y>My ≥ λmax(M)−1‖My‖2, with λmax(M) ∈ R>0. 
Appendix A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the equilibrium point col(x∗, λ∗, z∗) with
z∗ = V>σ∗. Then, (16) at the equilibrium reduces to
0 = −ρLλ∗, and thus λ∗ = λ∗ ⊗ 1.
Moreover, manipulating (17) and evaluating it in the
equilibrium lead to
0 ∈ NRmN≥0 (λ∗) + b¯ − Λx∗ + ρz∗ + (2ρδ + 1)Lλ∗ . (A.1)
Recalling that Lλ∗ = 0 and multiplying both sides of
(A.1) by (1> ⊗ I) leads to
0 ∈ (1> ⊗ I)(NRmN≥0 (λ∗) + b¯ − Λx∗ + ρz∗) . (A.2)
Using the fact that
∑
i∈N NRm≥0 (λ
∗) = N∩i∈NRm≥0 (λ
∗) =
NRm≥0 (λ
∗) and the assumption 1> z∗ = 0, (A.2) becomes
0 ∈ NRm≥0 (λ∗) + b¯ − Ax∗ . (A.3)
Finally, (15) evaluated in the equilibrium is
0 ∈ F(x∗) + NΩ(x∗) + Λ>λ∗ , (A.4)
or equivalently
0 ∈ ∇ fi(x∗i , x∗−i) + NΩi (x∗i ) + A>i λ∗ , ∀i ∈ N . (A.5)
Inclusions (A.5) and (A.3) are the KKT conditions in
(6), and hence from [27, Th. 3.1] we conclude that
col(x∗, λ∗, z∗) is a v-GNE of the game. 
Appendix A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
From [31, Th. 2], the choice of ϑ, εi, δ and τi in (19)
implies that Φ − ϑI  0. Then, invoking [32, Lem. 5.6]
we obtain that Φ−1B and Φ−1A are respectively χϑ-
cocoercive and maximally monotone in the Φ induced
norm. Furthermore, it also shows that (Id − Φ−1B) is
1
2χϑ -AVG and JΦ−1A B (Id + Φ
−1A) is FNE. Applying
[33, Prop. 2.4], we conclude that T is 2χϑ4χϑ−1 -AVG. The
Krasnosel’skii˘ iteration in (11) converges to$∗ ∈ fix(T )
if η ∈ (0, 4χϑ−12χϑ ), [29, Th. 5.14].
The above argument establishes that limk→+∞ σk =
σ∗, and hence limk→+∞ V>σk = V>σ∗ =: z∗. There-
fore, z converges and consequently we conclude that
Algorithm 1 converges to col(x∗, λ∗, z∗). The choice of
the initial value z0 = 0, implies that 1> zk = 0, for all
k ∈ N since its values will be in the range of L. Finally,
applying Theorem 1 we prove that the equilibrium is the
v-GNE of the original game. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
From the proof of Theorem 2, we know that T is
2χϑ
4χϑ−1 -AVG, and therefore it can be rewritten as T =
(1 − 2χϑ4χϑ−1 )Id + 2χϑ4χϑ−1 P, where P is nonexpansive, [29,
Prop. 4.35]. By substituting it into (22), we obtain
$k+1 = $k +
2ηχϑ
4χϑ − 1ζ
k(P − Id)$ˆk . (B.1)
For (B.1), we apply [16, Lem. 13 and Lem. 14], to
conclude that ($k)k∈N is bounded and that it converges
almost surely to $∗ ∈ fix(P) = fix(T ), for 2ηχϑ4χϑ−1 ∈
(0, cN pmin2ϕ¯√pmin+1 ], thus if η ∈
(
0, cN pmin2ϕ¯√pmin+1
(
2 − 12χϑ
)]
. Since
fix(T ) = zer(A + B), we conclude from Proposition 1
that {xk}k∈N≥0 converges to the v-GNE of (2) almost
surely. 
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4
The change of auxiliary variables in Algorithm 3
from σ to z leads to a different update rule for λ, while
the one for x remains unchanged. Therefore, if we show
that the modified update of λ is equivalent to the one in
Algorithm 2, we can infer the convergence from Theo-
rem 3.
We prove by induction that, given an agent i, the up-
date of λi at time k in Algorithm 2 and 3 are equivalent.
Note that the two update rules are equivalent if it holds
that
z˜i(k) = ([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) , (C.1)
for every k > 0 and i ∈ N .
Base case: Iteration k is the first in which agent i up-
dates its variables. If k = 0, then in AD-GENO µi = 0m
for every i and σˆ(0) = 0mM in AD-GEED, hence (C.1)
is trivially verified.
If instead k > 0, it holds that zi(k) = zi(0) = 0m,
while σˆ(k) , 0mM , since the neighbors of i can update
more than once before the first update of i (as shown in
Example 2). We define for each j ∈ Ni the set S j(k), a
t ∈ N where t < k belongs to S j(k) if, at the iteration t,
the agent j completes an update. The maximum time in
S j(k) is denoted as m j(k) := max{S j(k)} and Sˇ j(k) :=
S j(k) \ m j(k). From this definitions, we obtain that
([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) = ∑l∈Eouti σl(0) −∑d∈Eini σd(m j(k)) ,
(C.2)
where j is the element of ed different from i. Further-
more, from the update rule of σd in Algorithm 2, we
derive
σd(m j(k)) = σd
(
max{Sˇ j(k)}
)
+ ηδρ
(
λ j
(
max{Sˇ j(k)}
)
− λi(0)
)
= ηδρ
∑
h∈Sˇ j(k)
(
λ j(h) − λi(0)
) (C.3)
Substituting (C.3) into (C.2) leads to
([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) = ρηδ
(∑
j∈Ni\{i}
∣∣∣Sˇ j(k)∣∣∣ λi(0)
−∑ j∈Ni\{i}∑h∈Sˇ j(k)λ j(h)) . (C.4)
From the definition given in Algorithm 3 of µi, we attain
that ([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) = ηδµi = z˜i(k), therefore (C.1)
hold.
Induction step: Suppose that (C.1) holds for some k¯ >
0 that corresponds to the latest iteration in which agent
i performed the update, i.e. zi(k¯) , 0.
Consider the next iteration k in which agent i updates,
k > k¯. Here, S j(k) is defined as above, but for time in-
dexes (k¯, k]. Following similar reasoning in the previous
case, we obtain
([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) = ([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k¯)
+ ηδρ
∑
l∈Eouti ([V]l ⊗ Im)λˆ(k¯)
+ ηδρ
(∑
j∈Ni\{i}
∣∣∣Sˇ j(k)∣∣∣ λi(0)
−∑ j∈Ni\{i}∑h∈Sˇ j(k)λ j(h))
(C.5)
where we used the fact that l ∈ Eouti is updated at the
same time of i. Furthermore, from the induction as-
sumption,
([V>]i ⊗ Im)σˆ(k) = zi(k¯) + ηδρ
(∑
j∈Ni\{i}
∣∣∣Sˇ j(k)∣∣∣ λi(0)
−∑ j∈Ni\{i}∑h∈Sˇ j(k)λ j(h))
= zi(k¯) + ηδρµi = z˜i(k) ,
(C.6)
where the last step holds because in the reading phase
of Algorithm 3, we reset to zero the values of µi, every
time that i starts an update. Therefore, (C.1) holds for k.
This concludes the proof by induction, showing that
the update of λi defined in Algorithm 3 is equivalent to
the one in Algorithm 2, for any k. Finally, since the pair
(x, λ) has an update rule equivalent to the one in AD-
GEED, the convergence of (x(k))k∈N to the v-GNE of
the game (2) follows from Theorem 3. 
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